Response to

The August 30th, 2004 edition of The New Republic Online contains an article by Gregg Easterbrook entitled "On Leave: The Case for Getting Out of Iraq." Read the original article here.

I appreciate Easterbrook's rational and well-written approach to his arguments. He often bucks the "liberal" label applied to The New Republic by arguing, for example, that the environment is not the huge, deteriorating mess that other liberals loudly proclaim. I particularly appreciate his column on NFL.com under the persona of TMQ ("Tuesday Morning Quarterback"), an intelligent and entertaining weekly analysis of pro football; his juvenile fascination with scantily clad cheerleaders and irrational fear of SUV's notwithstanding (Mr. Easterbrook, I have 5, soon to be 6 children and all the stuff that accompanies them. What else would I haul the family around in?). Easterbrook's biggest failing, in my humble opinion, is that he either completely ignores certain aspects of an argument, or gives it short shrift. For example, in an article several weeks ago he argued that a big problem with the war in Iraq was that there was no formal surrender ceremony. He provided examples of wars that ended with such and argued that it created a finality to the war that served, if nothing else, as a strong psychological message to the conquered to yield and not rise up. What I would consider to be a point germane to the question is - To whom would we have presented the surrender documents? Who had the authority to surrender for Iraq? Suppose a Shiite leader had "surrendered." Do you honestly believe that the Sunni would accept that agreement and would not have risen up? Do you believe that al Sadr would have accepted such an agreement? It's pretty clear that the answers to both of those questions are "no." However, Easterbrook dismisses the issue with a brief acknowledgement of the issue, and then he presses on. (Sorry, I don't have access to the original text right now to quote him directly). So, what is a fundamental operational issue, "Was it even possible to have a surrender ceremony in Iraq" is ignored. Once again, I find Easterbrook ignoring a whole side of an issue in the recent article. (See, I did find a way to finally get back to the original point of this post!)

Admittedly, the subtitle of the article is "The Case for Leaving Iraq," not "Should We Leave Iraq?" However, no one else produced an article "The Case for Not Leaving Iraq." This leaves me feeling like I have been left intellectually incomplete. So, my purpose here is to provide "The Case For Staying in Iraq."

To summarize his basic argument: The U.S. went to Iraq to depose Saddam, liberate the Iraqi people, and hunt down WMD. We deposed Saddam quite well, liberated the people, and have discovered that there were no WMD (my qualification: at least not in the amounts and types that was widely believed). He rightly directs the discussion away from blame for faulty intelligence and so on. Then he states, "Today we are relieved to know that Iraq did not possess banned weapons. So why don't we leave?...the dictator has been removed and the liberation offered. So why don't we leave?" He then argues a "que sera, sera" point of view that whether we leave now or later, there might be civil war, uprisings, bloodshed and other bad things and staying only delays those things. The only people that can solve their problems are the Iraqis, and the sooner we leave, the sooner they can go about solving their problems. Further, once we are gone, there will no longer exist an incentive for the locals to fight against the foreign invader/occupier. No country has ever "solved" the problem of occupying a country in which the local populace rises up against the occupier (citing Vietnam and Palestine as examples).

My interpretation of his argument is that since it has not been done before, we wont' be able to do it, either and we should just leave and let the chips fall where they may.

Here are the problems I find with his arguments:

Logic does not dictate that because no one has successfully occupied and then left a rebellious country without upheaval that we will not be able to. Easterbrook is suggesting that we choose the known evil over the unknown. We know that if we leave the country in its current state, there will be violent civil war. I cite Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviet Union as the example. When the Soviets left, there was no strong central government, only loosely allied tribes and other groups who fought for the common purpose of ousting the Soviets. With the attacker gone and no central authority, the country devolved into bloody civil war which allowed the Taliban to arise. The outcome could also be similar to Somalia - no central government and only regional warlords constantly battling each other for control. Only a strong central government with a well-trained police force/army has any chance of organizing a peaceful Iraq once the international forces have left. Easterbrook acknowledges this when he cites Nazi brutal force as the only way that occupiers have succeeded against rebellious locals.

So, the answer to "Why don't we leave" is "To stay long enough to leave a strong central government rooted in the ideals of liberty and law and with a sufficiently trained police force and military." An inclusive government with the resolve and strength to negotiate or, if necessary, battle its way out of militant uprisings in cities like Najaf and Fallujah. One that will provide an outlet for Sunni, Shia and Kurd alike. They will be required to take those actions because not everyone will agree to have a representative government; heck, not even everyone in the U.S. agrees to a representative government. This is the only possibility for a free Iraq. The Bush administration has said this many times - why do commentators like Easterbrook and others ignore that? That answer also addresses the question, "when will we leave Iraq?" When the nascent government is strong enough to stand on its own and enforce the representative will of the people against those who would only destroy it.

The recent success of the Allawi government in negotiating the end of fighting with the al Sadr militia is a microcosm of what needs to happen on a larger scale. The Iraqi government was the face of authority, but required International military support. Eventually, with enough trained and ready troops, the Iraqi government can be both the face and the might. Then, it has a chance of succeeding.

"Why don't we leave?" Because leaving now will generate a quagmire and bloody civil war and may give rise to a regime, such as the Taliban, that would nurture terrorists (just as Saddam would have). Staying is the only way to have any hope of nurturing an Iraqi government strong enough to fight for the ideals that we went into Iraq for: Liberty and Law.

(I really haven't had enough time to really flesh this out and edit it, but I want to get it posted, incomplete as it is. Sorry).